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# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association*

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## MESSAGE SHOWS TRUMAN'S LACK OF LEADERSHIP IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

IN his message to Congress on the state of the union, delivered on January 21, President Truman took legitimate pride in reviewing this country's principal achievements in international affairs since he assumed office last April. At the same time he pointed out some of the tasks which remain to be done if the undertakings accepted by the United States at a series of international conferences are to be fulfilled. The American nation, the President declared, has always been a land of great opportunities. Now it must become "a land of great responsibilities to all the people of all the world." Nor shall we measure up to our responsibilities by "the simple return to 'normalcy' that was tried after the last war." The United Nations Organization represents "a minimum essential beginning"; it "must be developed rapidly and steadily."

**TOWARD CIVILIAN CONTROL OF GERMANY.** So far as detailed plans for the future are concerned, the President added little to the twelve-point program he had announced on Navy Day, October 27, 1945, in New York, except on two important issues: the occupation of Germany, and the need for all-round reduction of tariffs and other restrictions on trade. After having declared that administration of the American zone in Germany will be transferred "at the earliest practicable date" from military to civilian personnel, he said: "We are determined that effective control shall be maintained in Germany until we are satisfied that the German people have regained the right to a place of honor and respect." While this statement is still vague, it may help to assuage the fears of European nations who, after watching our rapid demobilization in Germany, had come to the conclusion that the United States was planning to withdraw from the continent as soon as possible. At the same time, there is as yet

no indication that a civilian administration has been organized in Washington.

The President did not take the risk of arousing opposition in Congress by directly referring to the need for tariff adjustments by the United States. But he said that the credit the United States plans to extend to Britain would be sufficiently justified by the fact that it permits the British to avoid discriminatory trade arrangements; and added: "The view of this government is that, in the longer run, our economic prosperity and the prosperity of the whole world are best served by the elimination of artificial barriers to international trade, whether in the form of unreasonable tariffs or tariff preferences or commercial quotas or embargoes or the restrictive practices of cartels."

### NEED FOR FORCES ABROAD EXPLAINED.

On the hotly debated question of demobilization, the President belatedly explained the connection between this country's commitments to occupy, disarm, and administer occupied territories and the need for armed forces adequate to perform these tasks. He did not tackle the issue of whether or not the country will have to consider adopting compulsory military service. But he agreed with the estimate of the War and Navy Departments that by 1947 we shall still need a strength of about two million men, including officers, and said that if the campaign for volunteers does not produce that number, it will be necessary, by additional legislation, to extend the Selective Service Act beyond May 16, when the existing law expires. He pointed out, moreover, that action along this line should not be postponed beyond March, "in order to avoid uncertainty and disruption."

That considerable progress has been made by this country during the past eight months in clarifying the scope of its international obligations is a matter

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of record. The real tests of our willingness to participate in international organization on a permanent basis, however, lie ahead. Some of these, like the preparation of peace treaties in Europe, the President mentioned. Others he refrained from mentioning, notably the policy we shall adopt toward the bases we claim in the Pacific, both Japanese-owned and Japanese mandates; the extent to which we shall be prepared to supplement our emotional concern about Palestine with more liberal provisions for immigration from Europe; the vexed question of intervention versus non-intervention in Argentina, closely linked with the decline in our relations with several other countries of Latin America, now that the urgency for giving them wartime economic aid has passed; the use of atomic energy for constructive peacetime purposes, as distinguished from control of the atomic bomb; the form that civilian administration will take in Germany and Japan; and the extent to which the United States will be able to maintain a delicate balance in the Near and Middle East between Britain and Russia. On several of these issues, as well as on the problem of tariff adjustments, already mentioned, opposition can be expected both in and out of Congress.

**THE PUBLIC AND FOREIGN POLICY.** In his radio address of January 3 President Truman, discussing domestic legislation, had appealed to the voters to put pressure on their Congressmen for passage of a number of important controversial measures. He may make a similar appeal when controversial international projects come up for Congressional discussion. But, without in any

way minimizing voter participation in the making of foreign policy, two important points must be borne in mind. Political leaders, and this means the executive as well as Congress, cannot shuffle off their responsibilities on to the voters. They must have the courage to submit their convictions and proposals to public scrutiny, criticism and discussion, instead of taking the easiest way out, as has been done too often in recent months, when most officials, whether elected or appointed, have thought more about the coming 1946 elections than about the welfare of either the nation or the world. Second, while it is useful to make our views known to our Congressmen, voters cannot hope to obtain constructive action from those Congressmen who owe their election to the very fact that they had originally opposed such action. The time for the voters to bring pressure for intelligent Congressional decisions is not when Congressmen are already in office, or even when they are running for office, but long before that when the machines of both principal political parties are engaged in making nominations for primaries.

The worst thing that could befall American democracy would be for the people to lose confidence in the judgment and conscience of political leaders. That is the way that democracy has been brought low in other countries. Brilliance is not always attainable. But honest attempts to discuss international problems in the light of the interests of the nation as a whole, and not of narrow local or sectional prejudices, can and should be expected, both at the White House and on Capitol Hill.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

## TRUSTEE SYSTEM NO THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS IN PACIFIC

The opening meetings of the United Nations Organization have brought to light the complexities of the trusteeship problem, which was found so delicate at Dumbarton Oaks that it was referred at that time to the draftsmen of the UNO Charter. When the question came up for discussion at the San Francisco Conference, sharp divergences of view were compromised only by leaving a number of significant loopholes in the Charter's trusteeship provisions, and the efforts of the UNO Preparatory Commission to close these loopholes last autumn proved unsuccessful.

Under the circumstances, it is of particular importance that Great Britain, Belgium, New Zealand and Australia have assumed leadership in announcing on January 17 their intentions to place under UNO trusteeship the mandates of Tanganyika, Cameroons, Togoland and Ruanda-Urundi in Africa, and Samoa, New Guinea and Nauru in the Pacific islands. South Africa's failure to follow this lead was not surprising, in view of the stand taken by General Smuts in 1919 and reiterated by him at San

Francisco. More perplexing was the position adopted by France. Numerous contradictory reports in the past two weeks indicate division of opinion in Paris as to whether the French mandates of Togoland and Cameroons should be placed under trusteeship. Foreign Minister Bidault, in his speech to the Assembly on January 19, said France was ready to study the terms of trusteeship, but at the first business meeting of the trusteeship committee two days later French representative, M. G. Monnerville, is reported to have presented a plan to make the mandates an integral part of the French state.

**TRUMAN'S STATEMENT ON BASES.** In view of the initiative previously taken by the United States in developing the trusteeship role of the United Nations, President Truman's press conference statement on January 15, that this country intends to place under trusteeship Japanese islands it has seized, sounded inadequate. Secretary of State Byrnes, prompted by growing criticism of American silence, is reported to have cabled the President from London requesting him to announce this country's posi-

tion. In his news conference, consequently, the President spoke on the subject, and it is not surprising if neither he nor the reporters present fully discussed the complexities and subtleties of the Charter's trusteeship provisions. Considerable confusion of thought resulted. A carefully prepared statement by experts of the State Department would clearly have been better than the off-hand informality of a news conference for an announcement on a matter of such crucial importance as the future of the Pacific islands. Although State Department officials in Washington later issued explanations of the President's comments, it is reported that they were surprised by his announcement.

The President spoke interchangeably of sole "control" and sole "trusteeship," but he apparently intended to say that the United States (1) would put all captured Japanese mandates and other islands under the trusteeship system; (2) would later designate certain "strategic" islands to be administered in trust by the United States; and (3) would be willing to have the United Nations Organization name the powers to administer the remaining islands.

The President's statement, defended by Senator Fulbright, was vigorously condemned by a group of Senators including Democrats Byrd and Eastland, and Republicans Tobey and Capehart. Senator Eastland expressed the belief that a treaty conceding any form of UNO control over the islands would face "very tough sledding" in the Senate. The objections of these four opponents of the plan had been voiced before when, as a special subcommittee of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, they had paid a visit to the San Francisco Conference.

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IS U.S. SECURITY ENDANGERED? The remarks of the Senators have obscured the fact that the loopholes in the Charter were designed to protect just such special interests as we have in the Pacific islands. It is true that we are not legally bound to place any territory under trusteeship, but our moral obligation is difficult to deny, and it was President Roosevelt's intention to fulfill that obligation. If the United States does take this step, the territories must be placed under trusteeship by a special agreement among the "states directly concerned." This phrase in the Charter, which has not been as yet defined, has already aroused debate. However, irrespective of who the "states directly concerned" are eventually determined to be, the significant fact is that the United States is completely free to specify, for example, that the nature and extent of fortifications in "strategic" islands in which this country is sole trustee must at all time be a matter purely for United States decision. The Security Council, according to the Charter, can only approve or disapprove such a special agreement. If it disapproves the agreement, the United States is still free to annex the islands outright; if it approves the agreement, it is bound not to interfere at any time with the nature and extent of our fortifications. If we insist on such conditions, however, we must be prepared to extend the same rights to other powers in the "strategic" areas under their trusteeship.

Senator Byrd has objected that, if the Security Council should reject our special agreement, we would be in the unfortunate position of having to take the islands arbitrarily "in defiance of UNO disapproval." Therefore, he maintains, we should keep the islands as our "exclusive property" and not even "submit the question." This logic is doubly questionable for it assumes that the Security Council would veto the agreement, and implies that we will avoid UNO disapproval if we withhold the islands from trusteeship. On the contrary, if Senator Byrd's proposal is adopted we not only would be taking a position comparable to that of France and South Africa, but would set a dangerous precedent for other powers by repudiating our opposition to territorial aggrandizement as a war aim. Our legitimate concern in the future of islands won at such a terrible cost in lives and money gives us good reason for careful deliberation, but the small potential disadvantage of trusteeship does not seem sufficient to outweigh the advantages of the fullest possible conformity with the spirit as well as the letter of the United Nations Charter.

VERNON MCKAY


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# Washington News Letter



## POLITICS OUTWEIGHS EXPERIENCE IN TOP U.S. APPOINTMENTS ABROAD

The United States has long suffered in its international relations from the presidential custom of choosing ambassadors and ministers from among retired politicians who are thought to deserve some sort of job, wealthy contributors of money to the political party of the President, and office-holders who can be quietly replaced only by transfer to a more dignified position. Apparently the Administration intends to carry on this tradition in its appointments to the United Nations Organization.

**RECENT NOMINATIONS FOR UNO.** Among the alternate delegates President Truman nominated to represent the United States at the first meeting of the General Assembly in London were included two elderly men with no experience in international affairs—Frank Walker, former chairman of the Democratic National Committee, and John G. Townsend, Republican Senator from Delaware from 1929 to 1941. The United States committee on nominations for the judges of the International Court of Justice of the United Nations on January 16 submitted the name of Green Haywood Hackworth, Legal Adviser to the State Department, as its candidate from the United States. His work has dealt for thirty years with narrow legalistic routine that has made it impossible for him to develop the breadth of views and imagination which the new court will require of its judges.

The number of capable officials handling foreign affairs for the United States outside the bounds of the United Nations Organization remains relatively small. No satisfactory basis for the selection of ambassadors has yet been established. Some, like Richard C. Patterson, Jr., Ambassador to Yugoslavia, have apparently been chosen because their lack of knowledge about the issues at stake in the countries to which they are assigned will enable them, the President hopes, to reach disinterested decisions concerning the comparative strength of rival political factions. The United States has a few ambassadors who have served as chiefs of missions in so many posts that they might be considered professional envoys, like Laurence A. Steinhardt, once a lawyer, who has been Minister to Sweden and Ambassador to Peru, Russia, Turkey, and now Czechoslovakia. Such appointments are so rare, however, as to lead to the conclusion that experience is seldom a requirement for elevation to the highest offices dealing with foreign affairs. In April 1945 President Truman chose as the United States Commissioner on Reparations,

with the rank of ambassador, Edwin W. Pauley, who was unfamiliar with international problems, but had been treasurer of the Democratic National Committee.

Many positions of the first importance in the conduct of United States foreign policy will shortly be vacant. One of the six assistant secretaryships in the State Department has been unfilled for three months, and James Clement Dunn, a career diplomat since 1919, is expected soon to resign as Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern and African Affairs. John G. Winant intends to resign from his post as Ambassador to Britain, and W. Averell Harriman would like to retire as Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. When General George C. Marshall has completed his delicate assignment as special envoy in China, Mr. Truman will have to find a permanent ambassador to represent him in that troubled and unstable country. The signing of a peace treaty with Italy later in the year will probably be followed by the withdrawal of Alexander C. Kirk as Ambassador to Italy. If the United States should modify its policy toward Spain, or if the Spanish situation should change, a successor for Norman Armour, who has returned to the United States from his embassy in Madrid, will have to be appointed. This country now is indicating its disapproval of the government of General Franco by leaving the ambassadorship vacant.

**IMPROVEMENT IN RANKS NEEDED.** The fact that persons of first-rank ability occupy only a relatively small number of the topmost foreign policy posts adds to the need for attracting able men and women to the Foreign Service and State Department. Last year, the Foreign Service prepared a confidential report for the Secretary of State, criticizing its own work and advocating an increase in the size of the service to meet the demands of our post-war foreign policy, an increase in the pay of ambassadors, and an increase in the allowances granted diplomats above their pay. The new federal budget which President Truman submitted to Congress on January 21 makes no allowances for such efforts to recruit the best young persons in the country for lifetime work in foreign affairs. The appropriations for the Foreign Service in the current fiscal year amount to \$61,438,800, but the budget proposes a reduction to \$53,177,300 for the next fiscal year. At the same time, the budget proposes a slight increase in the expenditure of the State Department as a whole from \$90,139,314 to \$91,705,100.

BLAIR BOLLES